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ABSTRACT 
 The Selective Optimization with Compensation (SOC) model for lifespan development 
(Baltes & Baltes, 1990) holds that as we age, our goals change from growth to maintenance. 
When people face difficulties, they work to minimize losses in order to maintain skills they 
already have physically, mentally, and socially.  Thus, we compensate when possible in order to 
maintain the life we have established. In the case of memory people assume that there is little 
they can do when memory starts to fail and forgetfulness becomes more prominent. In the 
present research, we examine memory self-appraisals to provide new evidence on memory self-
efficacy in later life. Additionally, we address memory aging knowledge and memory 
controllability as individual difference variables that contribute to subjective beliefs about one’s 
own memory. An intervention to improve beliefs held about memory was also carried out to 
examine differences in memory self-efficacy in the post-intervention stages through the use of 
the Memory Functioning Questionnaire, Memory Control Inventory, and the Knowledge of 
Memory and Aging Questionnaire. We found that memory self-efficacy levels in the oldest-old 
were the same as their younger counterparts, implying that subjective memory appraisals remain 
relatively stable in later life. Contrary to our expectations, high levels of memory knowledge and 
controllability were not significant predictors for memory self-efficacy. An intervention carried 
out with the oldest-old yielded no differences in meta-memory appraisals, and findings show 
their memory self-efficacy beliefs and control beliefs were already at high levels.
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INTRODUCTION 
 Successful aging has become a popular topic in the social gerontological literature.  
According to the Gerontological Society of America, successful aging is more about “adding life 
to years, not just years to life” (Baltes & Baltes, 1990).  This quotation stresses the importance of 
quality of life over quantity of years.  The sheer number of years lived does not make one 
successful.  Several attempts have been made to operationally define successful aging.  Rowe 
and Kahn (1997, 1998) classified successful aging as having few chronic health conditions, 
maintaining functional physical ability, and having an active engagement with life, both 
interpersonally and in a productive capacity.  The vast majority of older adults would not qualify 
as successfully aging under these criteria; for example of those aged 65 and older, 77% have 
multiple chronic health conditions (Machlin, Cohen & Beauregard, 2008).  However, even 
without meeting Rowe and Kahn’s criterion, older adults still rate themselves as aging 
successfully (Strawbridge, Willhagen & Cohen, 2002).  The discrepancy between objective 
versus subjective perceptions of successful aging suggests that older people may apply their own 
subjective criteria to evaluate whether or not they are aging successfully.  Understanding how 
older adults evaluate their functional abilities has implications for quality of life and is therefore 
an important topic for cognitive aging research. 
 The study of successful aging becomes increasingly important when demographic trends 
are considered.  In particular, the number of older adults in our society has increased 
dramatically over the past century.  Elderly adults comprise the most rapidly growing group in 
our population.  Due to improved efforts to maintain health as well as advances in medicine, the 
death rates of those aged 65 and over have greatly reduced (Rowe & Kahn, 1998).  In addition to 
the maintenance of health and physical function, a pressing issue among older adults today 
concerns the retention of cognitive functionality in later life.  Complaints of memory problems 
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are common in later life.  Older adults may worry that everyday forgetfulness may be signaling 
the onset of dementia, although not everyone will develop a dementing disorder in late adulthood 
(of those aged 71 and older, 13.9% have dementia; Plassman, Langa, Fisher, Heeringa, Weir, 
Ofstedal et al., 2007).  Numerous studies in the cognitive aging literature have shown that aging 
comes with deficits in episodic memory, defined as memory for personally experienced events 
bound in unique spatial and temporal contexts (see Bäckman, Small, Wahlin & Larsson, 2000).  
Because episodic memory is sensitive to context, episodic memory performance varies with 
factors both external (test type, test pacing, instructions, etc.) and internal (motivations, verbal 
ability, interests, etc.).  The more factors aiding the older participant, the less differences will be 
seen in their performance compared to a younger person (Bäckman, Mäntylä & Herlitz, 1990).  
For example, while free recall testing shows age differences, recognition tests show much 
smaller, or sometimes no differences with age (Bäckman et al., 1990).  Performance on memory 
tasks can be improved for older adults by keeping the encoding and retrieval conditions similar.  
Older adults that perform at higher levels typically have a higher level of verbal skills, or task 
relevant pre-existing knowledge (Bäckman et al., 1990; Craik, 2000; Craik, 1986; Craik, Byrd & 
Swanson, 1987).  
However, for the oldest-old, typically defined as over the age of 90, no form of memory 
is resistant to aging effects.  However, the degree of deficit varies greatly (Bäckman et al., 2000).  
The largest age-related memory deficits appear in episodic and working memory tasks (see 
Elliott, Cherry, Silva Brown, Smitherman, Jazwinski, Yu, & Volaufova, 2011; Bäckman et al., 
2000).  Memory intervention magnitude is smallest for the oldest-old adults (Bäckman et al., 
2000).  While there are plenty of studies that look into memory interventions (for review see 
Reijnders, van Huegten & van Boxtel, 2013), the literature is sparse in attempts to explore 
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memory interventions targeting nonagenarians.  Further research involving very old adults is 
needed to clarify what is known about cognitive abilities in the oldest-old. 
 The structure of this paper is as follows.  The first section will address successful aging 
and cognition, including two relevant theories of cognitive adaptation in later life (Baltes & 
Baltes, 1990; Baltes, Staudinger & Lindenberger, 1999; Heckhausen & Schultz, 1995).  The 
second section addresses memory self-efficacy and aging.  The third section covers individual 
differences.  The fourth section will address interventions to improve self-efficacy and control 
beliefs.  The fifth section provides an overview of the focus of the present research.  Results and 
their significance follow. 
Successful Aging and Cognition 
Successful Aging.  Rowe and Kahn (1997, 1998) established a three-pronged definition 
of successful aging that encompasses several aspects; one must be free of disease and disability, 
perform at high levels of cognitive and physical function, and have a social engagement with 
life.  Rowe and Kahn state that in order to succeed, one must work for it.  The authors note risk 
factors that increase with age (body mass index, cholesterol levels, blood pressure, etc.) as well 
as lifestyle choices (physical activity, dietary factors, etc.) that could lead to disease or disability 
in the later years.  The importance of maximizing cognitive and physical health is also stressed, 
with education as the strongest predictor of maintaining high cognitive functioning.  Longevity is 
linked to belonging to a social network as well as participating in productive activities.  These 
provide an older person with emotional support and ward off isolation and feelings of loneliness.  
Having high levels of self-efficacy and control were found to be predictive of participation in 
productive activities in later life.  The authors note a slowing of processing speed and reduced 
capabilities in explicit memory (intention to remember, recalling a particular name, number place 
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or demand) as cognitive declines that accompany aging (Rowe & Kahn, 1998).  The slowing 
might be due to a decrease in the number of neurons in the brain (Aldwin & Fox Gilmer, 2013; 
DiGiovanna, 1994, 2000).  Reductions are especially pronounced in areas responsible for 
voluntary movement, vision and hearing.  The basal ganglion loses volume as well as areas that 
produce acetylcholine used for short-term memory functioning and norepinephrine to regulate 
sleeping (Digiovanna, 1994, 2000).  The aging brain contains neurofibrillary tangles that may 
reduce the amount of neurotransmitters released at the synapses, as well as amyloid plaques 
(Digiovanna, 1994, 2000).  Changes in the blood-brain barrier also occur with aging, and this 
lessens the protective function the barrier once held, and puts neurons at a higher risk for 
exposure to toxins (Aldwin & Fox Gilmer, 2013).  These biological changes in the aging brain 
are reflected in the age-determined changes experienced in later life. These changes do not 
indicate disease (at normal levels), merely the aging process.   
 Rowe and Kahn’s model of successful aging reflects a medical perspective, stressing the 
absence of disease (Aldwin & Fox Gilmer, 2013; Siegler, Bosworth & Poon, 2003).  Many 
scholars have redefined successful aging so that people are able to qualify as successful even if 
they have a chronic disease.  Operationalizing successful aging must account for many factors.  
Jeste and his associates establish their definition of successful aging to also include positive 
psychology traits like resilience (Jeste, Salva, Thompson, Vahia, Glorioso, Martin, et al., 2013).  
The results indicate that older adults hold higher self-ratings of successful aging even though the 
older participants showed poorer physical health and cognitive functioning.  Margrett, Mast, 
Isales, Poon and Cohen-Mansfield (2011) look at successful aging as a matter of cognitive 
vitality, defined as having a level of cognitive capability that allows one to function in an 
everyday environment.  To have vitality one must have a combination of mediating factors 
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(social support, personality, mental and physical health, and nutrition) working in a balance.  
With this definition of cognitive vitality, it is possible for someone suffering from dementia to be 
considered successful, as vitality is not measured solely on cognitive health.  The Shifting 
Baseline Theory (Cohen-Mansfield, 2011) states there are multiple levels of well-being, and 
individuals have a baseline of well-being they maintain.  Even as their baseline of functioning is 
reduced they are able to return to their well-being status.  A different aging theory (Martin, 
Despande-Kamat, Poon & Johnson, 2011) looks at events that have occurred throughout life as 
predictive of ones’ well-being.  An adaptation model incorporates influences in life that occurred 
both distally and proximally in time to the present as mediated through resources to effect well-
being (a developmental outcome; Martin et al., 2011). Still others argue that they (Rowe and 
Kahn) have left out some key elements such as spirituality (see Cherry, Marks, Benedetto, 
Sullivan & Barker, 2013b) and subjective ratings of success (see Pruchno, Wilson-Genderson & 
Cartwright, 2010a;  Pruchno, Wilson-Genderson, Rose & Cartwright, 2010b;  Strawbridge et al., 
2002).  One’s perceived success in aging is inferred based on subjective ratings of well-being 
(Strawbridge et al., 2002), the ability to adapt to changes in the environment, and managing their 
lives in such a way to reduce negatives while highlighting positives (Freund & Baltes, 1998).   
When put to a test, subjective views of well-being play a role in successful aging.  
Strawbridge and colleagues (2002) addressed Rowe and Kahn’s definition of successful aging in 
relation to participants’ own perception of whether they were aging successfully or not.  They 
asked participants to state how much they agreed with a statement saying they were aging 
successfully on a Likert rating scale, and only ranked those marking strongly agree as aging 
successfully.  They followed the successful aging definition established by Rowe and Kahn in 
absence of disease, maintenance of functioning (physical and mental), and actively engaging 
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with life as a social aspect.  They then compared which participants qualified as successful by 
their subjective rating and those that qualified under Rowe and Kahn’s standards on measures of 
well-being.  These measures include ratings of happiness, energy levels compared to others, 
enjoyment from spare time, lack of depression, mental/emotional health, feeling loved, feeling 
satisfied with relationships, optimism/pessimism, perceived control, affect balance, and having a 
low amount of cynical distrust.  Of their 867 participants, only 18.8% passed the Rowe and Kahn 
criterion as aging successfully while 50.3% of participants rated themselves as aging 
successfully.  Of those 163 participants who Rowe and Kahn would count as successful, 36.8% 
did not agree- and subjectively rated themselves as not successful.  Of the participants that did 
not meet Rowe and Kahn’s criterion, 47.3% still rated themselves as successful.  These large 
discrepancies suggest Rowe and Kahn’s definition of successful aging is not the same definition 
held by most people when they evaluate their own aging.  It is also important to know what 
factors, if any, can change one’s perception of their success. 
 In response, Kahn (2002) agreed that the concept of successful aging should be 
operationalized. He said Strawbridge and colleagues made a fair effort to put measures to the 
definition established by himself and Dr. Rowe. Strawbridge and colleagues (2002) remarked 
that aging successfully according to the Rowe and Kahn standards would show little or no age-
relate declines, while Kahn clearly points to their notion that aging successfully does not mean 
no aging at all. Kahn states that his model of successful aging is compatible and complementary 
to Baltes and Baltes’ (1990) SOC model, as both state older people use what they have and work 
to make the best and most success of it.  The SOC model will be discussed more fully later on. 
According to Freund and Baltes (1998), people who are aging successfully maximize 
desired outcomes and minimize undesirable outcomes in their life.  A person who is aging 
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successfully would subjectively report that he or she is aging well (an evaluative measure), 
holding positive emotions (an affective measure), and seldom feeling lonely (a social measure). 
These three aspects are incorporated into the measures and scales used to define successful aging 
for Freund and Baltes.  In order to maximize desired outcomes in their lives, people select things 
they are well suited for.  And when people encounter losses they compensate for the loss, and 
make up for in in other ways.  This follows the lifespan development theory known as the 
Selective Optimization with Compensation (SOC) model (Baltes & Baltes, 1990), which is the 
focus of the following section. 
The SOC Model.  The SOC model is based on adaptation to biological and lifestyle 
changes over time (Baltes & Baltes, 1990).  This conceptual formation is based on several 
propositions.  Baltes and Baltes propose that there are drastic differences between people who 
age normally, optimally, and pathologically.  Normal aging occurs without pathology, both 
biologically and mentally, while pathological aging is typically classified with the development 
of dementia or Alzheimer’s disease.  Optimal aging therefore is someone in age-enhancing 
conditions, having aged gracefully.  Optimal aging is synonymous with successful, with a less 
competitive connotation.  Aldwin and Fox Glimer (2013) stress that optimal aging or aging well 
can be reached through any number of paths, and it is a process that each faces his or her own 
vulnerabilities and struggles.  Aging introduces increased variability, or individual differences in 
the population.  There is still a great deal of plasticity in function and the learning capacity of 
older adults is still present.  Aldwin and Fox Glimer (2013) also state that knowledge and 
pragmatics can offset age related declines in cognitive mechanics.  According to Baltes and 
Baltes, pragmatics refer to accumulated knowledge, similar to crystallized intelligence, while 
mechanics refer to basic information processing skills, similar to fluid intelligence.  The 
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assumption is that when fluid intelligence starts to fade in older age, knowledge and pragmatics 
set in to compensate. In support of this view, Baltes and Baltes refer to the classic Salthouse 
(1984) study where typists, both young and old, are measured on typing speed (a measure of 
mechanics) and the younger typists are faster.  The older typists still display higher levels of 
performance, however, and this is due to their ability to read further ahead in the text (a show of 
knowledge and pragmatics making up for lost pace).  With this background information in mind, 
the Baltes and Baltes SOC model states that people use the processes of selection, optimization, 
and compensation to manage the balance between gains and losses (though the balance is tipped 
more toward the losses in old age). 
 When a person is faced with losses, be that reduction in their mental capacities, 
deterioration of a particular function, or an altered environment, they must work to shape their 
new life capabilities and conditions into a condensed version of an altered yet effective life.  The 
way to transform one’s life when faced with losses is through the processes of selection, 
optimization, and compensation.  One can select to partake in fewer but more meaningful 
activities when their stamina is shortened.  Optimization refers to practicing skills already 
acquired for maintaining goals.  Compensation allows one to make up for losses by finding other 
ways to complete goals (Baltes & Baltes, 1990).  When we age it becomes exceedingly 
important to maintain what we have gained in the course of life and reduce losses.  In this way, 
we shift resources more toward maintenance methods in the later years (Baltes et al., 1999).   
 The Lifespan Theory of Control. Heckhausen and Schultz (1995) have proposed a similar 
lifespan development theory that focuses on control.  According to Heckhausen and Schultz 
(1995), people are motivated to gain control over their environment.  They can do this via 
primary control (directly altering their environment) or secondary control (change one’s self to 
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be better fitted to the environment).  Secondary control, which is very similar to the SOC 
processes, acts to minimize losses of one’s primary control over the environment, and works to 
maintain and expand that control.  A commonly used example of secondary control is taking 
medications to alter oneself, making themselves better adapted to their environment.  
Interestingly enough, losses of control are more easily spotted in other people rather than in 
oneself (Heckhausen & Schultz, 1995), implying that people have limited insight into their own 
aging.  This ability to spot where others are falling short more accurately than in one’s own 
attempts seems to showcase the subjective appraisal of our memory and the appraisals of 
perceived control on memory. 
Memory Self-Efficacy and Aging 
Memory self-efficacy, or the beliefs one holds about the capabilities of their memory, can 
incorporate a number of different cognitive behaviors.  According to Rowe and Kahn (1998) 
those with a higher self-efficacy are better able to maintain sharp mental abilities than those with 
low self-efficacy.  Meta-memory encompasses self-reports of memory beliefs, or control, as well 
as knowledge about how memory functions (Hertzog, Dixon & Hultsch, 1990).  For example, 
Herzog et al. (1990) examined young and older adults’ meta-memorial judgments and found no 
age differences in accuracy of memory predictions or in people’s beliefs about their memory as it 
related to performance predictions, with both groups under estimating their abilities.  A closer 
look is needed for both knowledge about memory and memory control beliefs, and their possible 
impacts on memory performance.  Cavanaugh (1996) stated that no single measure of memory 
self-efficacy is adequate in isolation; therefore the use of several measurement instruments is 
ideal.  Memory self-efficacy has been measured through the use of several instruments, which 
are described in turn next.   
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 The MFQ.  The Memory Functioning Questionnaire (MFQ; Gilewski, Zelinski, & 
Schaie, 1990) was developed as an enhancement of the Metamemory Questionnaire (Zelinski, 
Gilewski & Thompson, 1980).  After a factor analysis on the Metamemory Questionnaire, 64 
items loaded onto 4 factors, and the tool was renamed the MFQ.  Of the 4 MFQ subscales, 33 
items of the MFQ loaded onto their Frequency of Forgetting scale, which was later reduced to a 
10-item Frequency of Forgetting scale that measures memory self-efficacy (Zelinski & Gilewski, 
2004).  The MFQ also contains a Seriousness of Forgetting Scale, which gauges how much 
gravity is associated with moments of forgetfulness (rating misplacing car keys as a very severe 
memory error or not).  This instrument is comparable to the memory self-efficacy subscale that is 
part of the Memory in Adulthood Scale (MIA; Hertzog, Hultsch & Dixon, 1989).  The MIA 
(Hertzog, Dixon, Schulenberg & Hultsch, 1987) incorporates knowledge of memory as well as 
beliefs about memory, with seven dimensions to the instrument.  The MIA includes capacity (or 
one’s view of their own ability), change (one’s view of the stability of their memory), and locus 
(feelings of control over one’s memory).  The psychometric analysis of the MFQ found high 
internal consistency for all subscales (Cronbach’s alpha levels > 0.83; Gilewski, Zelinski & 
Schaie, 1990). 
 For the purposes of the present research, both the Frequency of Forgetting (FoF) and the 
Seriousness of Forgetting (SoF) subscales of the MFQ were selected for inclusion as these 
reduced scales were deemed preferable to administer to nonagenarians.  Both hold value when 
looking at memory self-assessments, as people would consider how often their memory in 
everyday life fails them as well of the gravity of the memory failure.  Reese and Cherry (2006) 
utilized the full Seriousness of Forgetting scale in the MFQ, and found younger adults perceived 
small slip-ups in memory to be more serious than older adults did.  However, Cherry, Brigman, 
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Reese-Melancon, Burton-Chase, and Holland (2013a) found no differences between young and 
old participants on the FoF and SoF subscales, so further research is necessary.   
Episodic Memory 
 Episodic memory was first coined by Endel Tulving (1972) as a distinct form of 
memory, separate from semantic memory.  Episodic memory is classified as remembering an 
event that has occurred in a certain time and place.  Tulving’s episodic memory fits the Brewer 
and Pani (1983) definition of personal memory.  A variety of laboratory tests measure aspects of 
episodic memory (recognizing previously studied material when new material is also present, 
free recall tests, etc.)(Roediger, Zaromb & Goode, 2008; Tulving, 1972).  Experiments and 
interventions typically focus on episodic memory phenomena by increasing what participants 
know of how episodic memory functions, and using various training methods to improve 
cognitive performance.  The age sensitivity of episodic memory ability is well documented.  
Numerous studies document age-related declines in healthy older adults (Craik, 1986; Craik, 
2000; Kausler, 1994).  In contrast, semantic memory remains strong in later life, though it is at a 
slower processing rate with increased age (Cherry & Smith, 1998). 
 With respect to the accuracy of subjective memory appraisals, it is widely recognized that 
older persons who are depressed tend to underestimate their memory capabilities, whereas an 
older person with cognitive impairment secondary to adult dementia, may overstate their 
memory performance (Gilewski & Zelinski, 1986).  Other evidence indicates that objective 
memory performance is linked with subjective memory appraisals, yet still not in a predictable 
way how one might imagine.  For example, Cook and Marsiske (2006) found that accuracy of 
subjective memory self-appraisals was greater from people with mild cognitive impairments 
compared with participant’s ratings without mild cognitive impairments.  Taken together, these 
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studies indicate that individual differences in affective and cognitive status should be taken into 
account as both have been shown to influence older adults’ perceptions of memory and objective 
memory performance.  Other individual difference variables that influence adult cognition in 
general and episodic memory function in particular are discussed more fully next. 
Individual Differences 
Individual differences play a large role in cognitive aging research, as each person has 
been through countless experiences, each of which may play some role in their current well-
being (Martin et al., 2011).  Variation increases with age, and memory performance as we age 
varies significantly on a person to person basis (Cherry & Smith, 1998).  These individual 
differences are typically explained by biological factors (Poon, 1985) as well as variations in 
personality and metamemory factors such as control beliefs or knowledge of memory processes 
(Lachman, Steinberg, & Trotter, 1987).  Differences such as level of educational attainment and 
knowledge or expertise in a particular area can greatly influence performance and beliefs held.  
With more memory knowledge, it logically follows the individual would have more accurate 
views and predictions of their own memory abilities and performance.  
The KMAQ.  The Knowledge of Memory and Aging Questionnaire (Cherry, West, 
Reese, Santa Maria & Yassuda, 2000) was developed to gauge participants’ knowledge of both 
normal memory aging and pathological memory aging.  This distinction is particularly relevant 
for the early diagnoses in deteriorating cognitive functioning.  The questionnaire is a 28-item 
true/false measure, with half of the items geared either towards normal memory aging or 
pathological memory aging.  The psychometric qualities of the KMAQ are established and 
include convergent and discriminant validity (Cherry et al., 2000), content validity (Jackson, 
Cherry, Smitherman & Hawley, 2008), and adequate internal consistency reliability (Cherry, 
   
 
13 
 
Allen, Jackson, Hawley & Brigman, 2010).  An option to mark an item as “don’t know” was 
added to reducing guessing and make the measure more sensitive (Cherry, Brigman, Hawley & 
Reese, 2003).   
The KMAQ has two subscales, one measures normal memory aging knowledge and the 
other measures pathological memory aging knowledge.  There is conceptual overlap between the 
scales, confirmed by a small but significant correlation (r = 0.29; Cherry et al., 2013a).  For the 
purposes of the current investigation, only the scores for the normal memory aging subscale will 
be used.  Our rationale for this design decision is based on the fact that if participants are making 
self-assessments of their own memory abilities, only the knowledge of normal memory aging 
should impact their responses.  Further, participants in the present research were screened for 
cognitive status using the Mini- Mental State Exam, a standardized cognitive assessment 
(MMSE; Folstein, Folstein & McHugh, 1975).  Thus, participants’ own memory capabilities 
were deemed to be within a range considered normal and healthy.  Consequently, pathological 
memory aging was not considered an important consideration in the proposed study.  
Prior research using the KMAQ has included different groups of students and laypersons 
from the community, such as undergraduate students, mental health professionals, caregivers and 
senior service providers, community-dwelling people, police officers, social workers (both 
professionals and students), older adults, and very old adults (Mol, de Groot, Willems & Jolles, 
2006; Jackson et al., 2008; Cherry et al., 2010; Cherry, Allen, Boudreaux, Robichaux & Hawley, 
2009; Cherry et al., 2003; Reese, Cherry & Copeland, 2000; Hawley, Garrity & Cherry, 2005; 
Hawley, Cherry, Su, Chui & Jazwinski, 2006).  Typical performance indicates persons have a 
higher level of knowledge regarding pathological memory aging than normal memory aging. 
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Previous work has shown that the KMAQ is sensitive to instructional manipulations and 
increases in participants’ knowledge of cognitive aging and memory performance are found post-
manipulation (Cherry et al., 2003; Jackson et al., 2008; Brigman & Cherry, 2010).  One might 
suspect that level of knowledge one has about normal memory aging as opposed to pathological 
memory aging would help increase accuracy of views for a memory self-appraisal task.   
Cherry and colleagues (2013a) tested the hypothesis that the higher the level of 
knowledge about memory, the higher the memory self-efficacy should be. They compared young 
adults (mean age = 20.3 years) to older adults (mean age = 71.4 years). They found that 
participants responded more accurately to the pathological memory aging questions on the 
KMAQ, and older participants performed better on both KMAQ scales than their younger 
counterparts. The MFQ was used to gauge memory self-efficacy. The authors controlled for age, 
education level, and verbal ability in their analyses of partial correlations between KMAQ and 
MFQ scales.  Their findings did not show significant correlations between the KMAQ scales and 
the subscales of the MFQ.  This study also looked at ageist stereotypes through a subset of 
questions on the KMAQ and found those with higher levels of knowledge about memory aging 
were better adept at dismissing ageist views of adult cognition.  The authors note it is possible 
that those holding a higher memory self-efficacy view may notice their memory successes and 
drive memory knowledge by making less biased assumptions about memory performance.  From 
this point of view, greater knowledge is linked to more positive views of memory self-appraisal, 
by reducing biased ageist responses.  Alternatively, people who perceive that memory 
functioning can be modified through the use of memory strategies despite age-related declines in 
later life may have more positive self- appraisals of their own memory.  The notion of memory 
controllability and how it is measured is discussed more fully next. 
   
 
15 
 
The MCI.  The Memory Controllability Inventory was designed as an individual 
differences measure, to capture differences in how much a person gauges their memory 
performance to be in their control. The MCI measures memory control and self-perceived 
memory ability with 12 items that tap beliefs regarding the present ability of one’s memory, their 
view of potential memory improvement, effort utility (putting in effort to control memory), and 
inevitable decrement in memory (Lachman, Bandura, Weaver & Elliott, 1995).  The subscales 
comprising the MCI were found to be acceptably reliable (coefficient alpha values equal to .58 or 
greater) and comparisons with the Personality in Intellectual Contexts control scales and 
Rosenbaum’s Self Control Scale displayed good convergent validity (Lachman, et al., 1995).  
Controllability beliefs in general decrease with an increase in age (Lachman, 2006).  High 
control beliefs are associated with successful aging attributes like wisdom and good health 
(Lachman, 2006, pg. 283; Lachman & Firth, 2004).  A person with a stronger sense of control 
would be better at coping with impossible situations by utilizing secondary control to change 
their own ways rather than trying to change the environment they are in (primary control).  
Lachman (2006) inferred that persons with low sense of memory control will likely have more 
memory problems because they are not trying to use compensatory methods to maintain current 
levels of performance.  Further Lachman, Neupert, and Agrigoroaei (2011) have shown that 
people want to have more gains than losses in matters of perceived control.  Typically, young 
and old people alike hold the view that memory aging is past the point of controlling for 
deterioration (Lachman, 2000).  Windsor and Anstey (2008) found evidence showing that control 
beliefs are linked to performance.  As the level of perceived control increased, performance on 
memory tests also improved.  People that believed their memory losses were inevitable also 
showed poorer memory performance (Lachman et al., 1987).  Lachman (2000) notes that when 
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constructing a memory training program that one must hone in on the participants’ beliefs about 
memory self-efficacy.  Generally speaking, memory self-efficacy perceptions relate to 
remembering people, events, and activities, which are expressions of episodic memory, as 
discussed next  
Interventions to Improve Memory Self-Efficacy 
 There is a small but growing literature on cognitive interventions to improve memory 
knowledge and memory self-appraisals.  Ideally, these programs would provide tools people can 
use to optimize their memory performance while simultaneously increase their knowledge base 
which may allow for compensation of memory loss.  Fairchild and Scogin (2010) designed a 
memory training program that was tailored for older adults.  The majority of the time spent in the 
intervention was educating the participants in the workings of memory and how it changes over 
time.  Their participants showed major changes in their beliefs about memory as well as some 
improvements to their objective memory performance in a names and faces task.  The authors 
were well aware of conflicting evidence found by other research groups citing improvements to 
objective memory performance does not lead to improvements regarding subjective memory 
beliefs. The present research will utilize intervention methods to attempt to elicit changes in 
participants’ beliefs about memory. 
 Turner and Pinkston (1993) set up a memory and aging workshop.  They found positive 
changes in attitudes and beliefs about aging and memory, with most of the realizations stemming 
from a renewed sense of control over our memory, and that it is not just deteriorating with 
increased age.  They tested the idea that negative beliefs about memory lead to poorer memory 
performance in participants (mean age = 72.6 years) and found that increasing participants’ 
knowledge of memory through their two-day intervention, the participants’ showed positive 
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changes in their perceptions of memory self-efficacy.  A follow-up study was carried out using a 
young comparison group (mean age = 23.8 years), and their analyses revealed the young did not 
show significant differences after participating in the two-day intervention program, showing no 
change in perceived memory control (Turner & Pinkston, 1993). This lends itself to the SOC 
theory in that when one does not try to compensate for cognitive decline he or she more or less 
accepts that as a loss.  However, if individuals are shown how to compensate for the loss, they 
may have a fresh perspective on the control they may possess over memory.  
 Rasmusson, Rebok, Bylsma and Brandt (1999) tested several methods of memory 
intervention programs including a seminar, listening to audiotapes, and completing a memory 
program on a computer.  Of these methods, the seminar and the computer program were found to 
improve objective memory scores.  The people that improved on the tasks were additionally 
found to be in better health, suggesting that physical health is strongly related to cognitive health.  
In fact, those with poorer health ratings were found to have worse performance on cognitive 
measures (Zelinski, Crimmins, Reynolds & Seeman, 1998).  Another intervention program 
(Schmidt, Zwart, Berg & Deelman, 1999) selected an intervention method that aimed to reduce 
negative beliefs and worries about memory functioning (Age M= 62, SD= 8.87).  The 
intervention decreased worries about memory failures (which holds relevance to the Seriousness 
of Forgetting subscale of the MFQ), and also increased participants’ knowledge of memory 
functioning. While the subjective appraisals improved, no differences were found on the studies’ 
objective measures of memory performance.  
 Brigman and Cherry (2010) examined young-old adults’ knowledge of memory aging 
assessed with the KMAQ and their subjective appraisals of fictitious characters’ memory with 
the use of vignettes featuring forgetful young and old people.  The MFQ was completed to 
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measure their subjective view of their memory ability.  With an informative intervention seminar 
that discussed normal memory aging- participants showed significant improvements on their 
KMAQ scores.  The perceptions that participants had of the forgetful older characters in the 
vignettes did not change, indicating that while memory knowledge is sensitive to instruction, the 
opinions and attributions assigned to forgetful characters may be less malleable. 
Focus of the Present Research 
In the present research we address three goals with respect to the study of memory self-
appraisal in late life.  The first goal focuses on subjective memory perceptions in the oldest-old, 
defined as persons aged 90 years and older.  Based on prior research (Hertzog et al., 1990; Lane 
& Zelinski, 2003), we expected that self-rated memory of the oldest-old participants would be 
lower than that of their younger counterparts.  To test the hypothesis that self-reported memory 
ratings are lower among nonagenarians than their younger counterparts, we compared the oldest-
old participants’ MFQ scores to young-old (60-74 years of age) and old-old (75-89 years of age) 
comparison groups.  The inclusion of two younger comparison groups provided us with a wider 
scope to examine differences between age groups in memory self-efficacy well into late 
adulthood.  Finding a significant age difference favoring the young-old adults would replicate 
prior research, and extend the literature to document age sensitivity in memory self-appraisal in 
nonagenarians who were not included in much of the previous research.  
The second goal of the present research was to examine the influence of individual 
difference variables (especially memory knowledge and memory control beliefs) on subjective 
memory appraisal.  We suspect that knowledge of memory aging influences self-reported 
memory ability, although prior studies have yielded conflicting outcomes (see Cherry et al., 
2013a, for discussion).  We also suspect that people’s beliefs about the controllability of memory 
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influence their self-reported memory abilities.  We examined age-related differences in memory 
knowledge and memory control beliefs by comparing responses on the KMAQ and MCI, 
respectively, across three age groups (60-74 year olds, 75-89 year olds, and 90+ year olds).  
Based on prior research (Hawley et al., 2006), we expected that the nonagenarians would be less 
knowledgeable about memory aging than their younger counterparts.  We also anticipated that 
MCI scores would be lower for the nonagenarians than those in the young-old and old-old age 
groups.  Of greater interest are the hypothesized associations between memory aging knowledge 
and memory control beliefs, and subjective memory appraisal.  We hypothesized that higher 
levels of knowledge about memory and a greater sense of control over memory aging will be 
associated with more positive appraisals of one’s own memory, perhaps independently of age. 
Our third goal addressed the malleability of self-reported memory and control beliefs 
through the use of a memory intervention based on the SOC model (Baltes & Baltes, 1990).  A 
subset of individuals who participated in the subjective memory assessment was recruited for the 
follow-up memory intervention.  This intervention was designed to test the hypothesis that 
memory self-efficacy and memory controllability ratings could be improved by providing 
objective information about memory aging.  Prior research has shown that interventions targeting 
control beliefs, as well as those focused on increasing memory aging knowledge improve 
subjective memory self-appraisals (Fairchild & Scogin, 2010; Turner & Pinkston, 1993).  
Lachman, Andreoletti, and Pearman (2006) used an intervention to improve subjective control 
beliefs about memory with participants ranging from age 21 to 83 years old.  Their findings 
yielded improvements in the subjective memory appraisals; however, the differences were much 
smaller than the objective memory performance improvements that they found when participants 
completed the episodic memory task post-intervention.  Other researchers have attempted 
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interventions, some of which manipulate the level of knowledge imparted to participants during 
the intervention (see Fairchild & Scogin, 2010).  Based on prior findings, we expected to observe 
higher ratings on the MFQ and MCI after the intervention relative to baseline.  If the oldest-old 
adults have poorer memory self-efficacy and memory control perceptions at baseline relative to 
the other groups as we suspect, then it seems reasonable to assume that the benefits of the 
intervention may be more pronounced for the oldest-old adults.  This added benefit for the 
oldest-old adults would also reflect the findings of Cherry et al. (2008) in the pictorial superiority 
effect.  The support of additional information given in the pictures assists the oldest-old more 
than their younger counterparts.  Thus added information provided in an intervention format 
could help the oldest-old catch-up to the younger group. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
All participants in the subjective memory assessment and intervention were enrolled in 
the Louisiana Healthy Aging Study (LHAS) which is a multidisciplinary study looking at the 
causal factors of longevity.  A collaboration of researchers from Louisiana State University, The 
LSU Health Sciences Center in New Orleans, Tulane University School of Medicine, the 
Pennington Biomedical Research Center, The University of Pittsburgh, and the University of 
Alabama at Birmingham all worked together to collect these LHAS data from a population living 
within a 40-mile radius of the Pennington Biomedical Research Center in Baton Rouge, LA.  
Participants were randomly sampled from the Voter Registration 2000 files for those between the 
ages of 20 and 64 years.  Participants aged 65 or older, who live within the greater Baton Rouge 
community, were sampled from the Medicare Beneficiary Enrollment Data file of the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services.  The final LHAS central database comprises 869 participants, 
with 275 participants being over the age of 90.  Of this larger sample, a total of 364 individuals 
participated in the cognitive assessment (Project 5) that examined cognitive functioning in late 
life (see Cherry, Hawley, Jackson, Volaufova, Su & Jazwinski, 2008; Cherry, Silva Brown, 
Jackson Walker, Smitherman, Boudreaux, Volaufova, et al., 2012).  A subset of these 
participants (N=101) completed the subjective memory assessment, yielding data that addressed 
the first two goals of the present investigation.  Average ages of the Young-Old, Old-Old, and 
Oldest-Old groups were 66.48, 82.70, and 91.00 years, respectively.  An intervention phase was 
carried out to examine hypothesized changes in memory beliefs and memory control after 
providing objective information about memory aging and memory exercises to improve memory 
awareness in daily life. The intervention participants (n=80) were a subset of the participants 
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who completed the subjective memory assessment. Half of the participants were nonagenarians 
and the other half were ages 65 to 89 years old.  
Sociodemographic information on the participants in the subjective memory assessment 
included age, educational attainment, vocabulary (as a proxy for verbal intelligence), and 
affective status indexed by the General Depression Scale (GDS; Sheikh & Yesavage, 1986).  
Cognitive status and knowledge of memory aging were assessed using the MMSE (Folstein et 
al., 1975) and the KMAQ (Cherry et al., 2003), respectively.  Subjective health assessments were 
taken at this time as well. Demographic information can be seen in Table 1 and Table 2.  
Table 1:  Cognitive, Demographic, and Health Characteristics 
   Young-old 
(n = 21) 
Old-old 
(n = 30) 
Oldest-old  
(n = 50) 
 
  M (SD) F p  
Age   66.48 (4.50) 82.70 (4.56) 91.00 (1.08) 409.30 <.001 
Vocabularya  22.62 (8.57) 25.03 (6.58) 23.76 (7.10) 0.698 0.500 
Cognitive statusb  28.81 (1.40) 28.37 (1.47) 27.30 (1.97) 6.999 0.001 
FDSc  5.86 (1.09) 5.82 (1.12) 5.67 (1.08) 0.290 0.749 
BDS  4.38 (0.88) 4.63 (0.96) 4.07 (1.15) 2.816 0.065 
SJSd  4.50 (0.87) 3.97 (0.51) 3.68 (0.67) 11.033 <.001 
GDSe  0.71 (0.96) 1.47 (1.93) 1.58 (1.69) 2.121 0.125 
Notes.  aVocabulary scores are based on a short-form of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale Vocabulary subtest (Jastak & Jastak, 1965). bCognitive status entries reflect scores on 
the Mini-Mental State Exam (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975).    cForward Digit Span 
(FDS) and Backward Digit Span (BDS) from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised 
(WAIS-R;  Wechsler, 1981).  dSize Judgment Span (SJS;  Cherry, Elliott & Reese, 2007).  
eGeriatric Depression Scale (Sheikh & Yesavage, 1986). 
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Informed consent was obtained for all participants according to protocols approved by the 
respective Institutional Review Boards.  All participants included in this study scored at least a 
Table 2: Demographics and Health Characteristics 
  Young-
Old 
(n = 21) 
Old-Old 
(n = 30) 
Oldest-
Old 
(n = 50) 
  
  N (%) χ2 P 
Gender     0.009 0.996 
 Male  9 (42.9) 13 (43.3) 22 (44.0)   
 Female  12 (57.1) 17 (56.7) 28 (56.0)   
Marital status     27.40 <0.001 
 Single  1 (4.8) 2 (6.7) 1 (2.0)   
 Married  16 (76.2) 10 (33.3) 11 (22.0)   
 Divorced  1 (4.8) 4 (13.3) 1 (2.0)   
 Widowed  3 (14.2) 14 (46.7) 37 (74.0)   
Education     5.604 0.469 
 High school or less  9 (42.9) 5 (16.7) 15 (30)   
 Some college / specialized 
training 
 5 (23.8) 10 (33.3) 14 (28)   
 College degree  6 (28.6) 11 (36.7) 13 (26)   
 Graduate degree  1 (4.8) 4 (13.3) 8 (16)   
Self-perceived health     1.142 0.565 
 Excellent / good  17 (81.0) 23 (76.7) 43 (86.0)   
 Fair / poor  4 (19.0) 7 (23.3) 7 (14.0)   
Health troubles stand in the way     5.625 0.229 
 Not at all  12 (57.1) 10 (33.3) 22 (44)   
 A little / some  8 (38.1) 12 (40.0) 21 (42)   
 A great deal  1 (4.8) 8 (26.7) 7 (14)   
Health compared to others     8.721 .068 
 Better  14 (66.7) 25 (83.3) 43 (87.8)   
 Same  7 (33.3) 5 (16.7) 4 (8.2)   
 Worse  0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (4.1)   
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25 or higher (Max. = 30) on the Mini-Mental State Exam (MMSE; Folstein et al., 1975) on 
intake interview and were free of known neurologic impairment due to stroke or adult dementia 
at the time of testing.  Analyses of the demographic information collected revealed an age group 
effect difference in cognitive status (MMSE), F(2,98) = 6.999, p = 0.001 (see Table 1), although 
mean cognitive status falls within the normal range for all three age groups.   
Materials and Procedure 
Subjective Memory Assessment.  For the subjective memory assessment, participants 
(N=101) completed an adapted version of the Practical Memory Concerns survey (PMC; Reese 
& Cherry, 2004), which is not included in the present research, and an adapted version of the 
original 64-item MFQ (Gilewski et al., 1990) which contains the reduced Frequency of 
Forgetting subscale (FoF-10, see Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004) and reduced Seriousness of 
Forgetting subscale (SoF-Revised; see Cherry et al., 2013a), along with the original MFQ 
Retrospective Memory and Mnemonics Usage subscales.  Internal consistency reliabilities of the 
FoF and SoF subscales for the MFQ were previously found to be 0.94 and 0.94, respectively 
(Gilewski et al., 1990).  Participants also completed the Memory Controllability Inventory (MCI; 
Lachman et al., 1995).   
Statistical Considerations and Data Analyses Plan.  To address the first goal of the 
present investigation, which concerned age effects in memory self-appraisal, we compared 
participants across three different age groups (65-74 year olds, n=21; 30 75-89 year olds, n=30; 
and 90 years old and older n=50) on two MFQ subscales, the Frequency of Forgetting subscale 
(FoF-Revised) which is interpreted as a measure of memory self-efficacy, and the Seriousness of 
Forgetting subscale (SoF-Revised; see Cherry et al., 2013a).  We ran an ANOVA with three age 
groups (young-old, old-old, and oldest-old).  We predicted that the oldest-old would have a 
   
 
25 
 
significantly lower FoF- Revised (indicative of more memory problems) as well as lower SoF- 
Revised scores (indicative of greater perceived seriousness of memory failures) than either of the 
younger age groups.  Reese and Cherry (2006) found younger adults to have higher scores on the 
SoF, but this finding was not replicated in other studies (see Cherry et al., 2013a).  
To address the second goal of the present research, which concerned individual 
differences in memory aging knowledge and memory controllability and their relationship to 
self-reported memory ability, we also looked at several key factors.  First, we compared 
participants’ scores on the KMAQ to access their level of memory knowledge in a one-way 
ANOVA, while controlling for potentially confounding factors such as educational attainment, 
MMSE scores, affective status, and verbal ability.  We also looked for a main effect of age group 
on MCI scores on a one-way ANOVA, controlling for the same possible confounds. We 
hypothesized that those with higher scores on the KMAQ normal memory aging subscale 
(indicative of more knowledge of normal memory aging) and better beliefs about the 
controllability of their memory (higher MCI scores), would have higher (more positive) 
responses on both the MFQ subscales.  Regression analyses were carried out on the KMAQ 
subscale scores and MCI (pretest scores, N=101) scores as predictors of MFQ ratings.  Recall 
that the scores on the KMAQ show knowledge of normal memory aging as well as pathological 
memory aging, however we only considered the normal memory aging subscale of the KMAQ.  
Memory Aging Intervention.  In all, 80 participants (40 young-old, ages 60-89, which 
combines the young-old and old groups previously used, and 40 oldest-old, aged 90 and older), 
all of whom completed the subjective memory assessment, took part in the memory intervention.  
Participants were tested in one of three groups: a wait-list control group (n=20; no further contact 
until 4-week posttest), a diary control group (n=20; personal memory diary kept over a 4-week 
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period), or an experimental group (n=40; received objective information about memory aging, 
two sets of memory exercises, and kept the memory diary over a 4-week period).  For each of the 
three groups, half of the participants were between 60-89 years of age and the other half were 
age 90 and older, ensuring an equal distribution of ages across groups. After checking for no 
differences between the two control groups on the MFQ and MCI pretest and posttest scores, we 
collapsed across groups and compared the 40 controls to the 40 participants in the experimental 
group. 
We included two control groups (a memory diary only group, and a no intervening 
activity or contact with Project 5 personnel group) to account for the possibility that the practice 
of keeping a memory diary might raise awareness of memory functioning in daily life or 
encourage memory self-reflection in a manner that might influence posttest performance, 
independently of the objective information that only those in the experimental group received 
(described later).  Any differences between the control group receiving the diary and the control 
group receiving nothing for the intervention can be interpreted as memory diary influences on 
self-reported memory at posttest.  However, we assume that the practice of keeping a memory 
diary alone will not influence posttest performance, as the critical part of the intervention is not 
the keeping of the diary; it is stressing memory adaptability and helping participants notice that 
their memory has undergone changes as they age, and that they have found ways to compensate 
for those changes into late adulthood.  Thus, the two control groups’ responses to the MFQ and 
MCI should be the same at posttest and pretest.  Initial analyses (separate t-tests) were conducted 
to test for this possibility.  Assuming that the two control groups do not differ at pre and posttest, 
and verifying this assumption statistically, we combined these two groups for the purpose of data 
analyses and overall evaluation of the efficacy of the intervention.   
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The experimental group received a memory diary, as well as feedback on their diary at a 
private follow-up meeting one week later.  The intervention took place at the follow-up meeting, 
which lasted approximately 90 minutes. Participants were given feedback about their diary 
entries from the past week, and instructed to continue using their diary for the next 3 weeks. 
Objective information about the nature of memory aging and adaptation to cognitive change in 
late adulthood was given.  Specifically, participants in this experimental intervention group were 
told that successful aging is not the absence of change, but adaptation to cognitive change, after 
the Baltes and Baltes (1990) SOC model (see Cherry & Smith, 1998).  They received a 
refrigerator magnet to remind them of this intervention meeting which emphasized successful 
aging is adapting to cognitive changes. These participants also completed memory exercises 
(free recall of everyday activities) and were given the opportunity to ask questions and discuss 
their performance on this task and their memory diaries.  The inclusion of discussion and 
feedback on the memory diaries, as well as presentation and discussion of objective information 
about memory aging was considered vitally important to the success of the intervention.  That is, 
previous research has documented that memory training exercises alone have little effect on 
peoples’ beliefs about memory aging (Floyd & Scogin, 1997).  Rather, memory training coupled 
with cognitive restructuring to improve adaptive beliefs about memory aging appears to be the 
most effective for older persons (Lachman, Weaver, Bandura, Elliott & Lewkowicz, 1992).   
 The subjective memory measures were re-administered at 4-weeks post-test to detect 
changes in self-reported memory abilities, including self-efficacy (indexed by the FoF-Revised 
and SoF-Revised) and memory control (MCI).  The memory diaries were also collected at this 
time.  Separate analyses were conducted to examine the narrative contents of the diaries, as well 
as frequency of entries for both memory successes and memory failures (Cherry et al., 2014).  
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We anticipated that the intervention would influence older adults (60 to 89 years) differently than 
the oldest-old adults (90+ years), showing a greater increase in memory self-efficacy ratings for 
the oldest-old, for continuity with results found by Cherry et al. (2008).  Our intervention placed 
emphasis on memory adaptability, and we hypothesized that the oldest-old (having started at a 
lower self-efficacy and controllability score) would adopt this thinking about their successful 
memory more readily.  All groups received a debriefing of the research and its objectives as part 
of the experimental protocol.  Separate 2 (age group) x 2 (pretest/posttest) x 2 (intervention 
group: control or experimental) mixed analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were carried out to test 
for significant main effects and interactions for both the MCI and the MFQ. Education levels, 
vocabulary scores, MMSE scores, and affective state were entered in as covariates.  
Expected results included a significant main effect for time of test, with the results of the 
post-test showing more positive subjective appraisals after the intervention.  A main effect of age 
group would show the oldest-old adults having lower overall scores of their memory self-
efficacy which matches the first goal of the present research. A main effect of intervention group 
would provide evidence that the intervention was strong enough to elicit a response change in the 
experimental group. A significant three-way interaction would reveal the intervention improved 
memory self-appraisals unequally between the age groups, which would suggest a greater 
advantage post-intervention for the oldest-old as their initial self-appraisals were significantly 
lower than the younger aged group.  
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RESULTS 
Goal 1: Age Group Differences in MFQ 
Table 3 presents mean ratings on the two MFQ scales by age group.  To address the first 
goal of the study, we conducted two ANOVAs for the 2 MFQ scales, Frequency of Forgetting 
(FoF) and Seriousness of Forgetting (SoF), controlling for potential confounding variables 
(education, vocabulary, cognitive status through the MMSE, and affective status through the 
GDS).  These covariates were selected based on prior research showing that education and 
vocabulary (a proxy for verbal intelligence) influence scores on the MFQ (Reese & Cherry, 
2006).  Other evidence has shown that educational attainment and depressive symptoms are 
strongly correlated with self-reported memory (Small, Chen, Komo, Ercoli, Miller, Siddarth, et 
al., 2001;  Zelinski, Burnight, & Lane, 2001).  We also included MMSE as a covariate, given the 
significant age group differences observed (see Table 1).  Univariate analyses yielded non-
significant age effects for both the FoF and the SoF subscales (see Table 3).  Three of the four 
covariates were non-significant, however, the GDS effect was marginally significant (F(1, 94) = 
4.573, p = 0.035 for FoF and F(1,94) = 4.038, p = 0.047 for the SoF).  This finding is consistent 
with previous research where depressive symptoms have been shown to negatively influence 
MFQ ratings (see Small et al., 2001).  Consequently, we control for GDS in the hierarchical 
regression analyses that address Goal 2 of the present research.   
To summarize, our hypothesis that MFQ scores would show age group differences was 
not supported.   The results presented so far indicate that nonagenarians’ self-reports of memory 
abilities do not differ appreciably from their younger counterparts.  This result parallels previous 
findings looking at younger and older participants’ scores on the FoF and SoF subscales (Cherry 
et al.; 2013a).   One explanation for this null result concerns low power, which hinders our 
ability to detect any differences among the age groups (effect sizes (partial η2) and power values 
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are reported in Table 4).   
Table 3:  Memory Aging Knowledge and Self-Rated Memory (Goals 1 and 2) 
   Young-old 
(n = 21) 
Old-old 
(n = 30) 
Oldest-old  
(n = 50) 
 
  M (SD) F  P 
MFQa       
 Frequency of forgetting  5.03 (0.70) 4.71 (0.70) 4.79 (0.86) 0.45 0.639 
 Seriousness of forgetting  5.01 (0.93) 4.58 (1.33) 4.79 (1.27) 0.78 0.461 
KMAQb       
 Normal  0.65 (0.16) 0.64 (0.17) 0.58 (0.20) 1.64 0.200 
 Pathological  0.76 (0.16) 0.73 (0.15) 0.65 (0.21) 4.121 0.019 
MCIc       
 Present ability  5.60 (0.75) 4.79 (1.14) 5.13 (1.31) 2.21 0.116 
 Improvement  3.52 (0.58) 3.98 (0.87) 3.75 (0.92) 1.41 0.250 
 Effort utility  5.59 (1.02) 5.28 (0.96) 5.18 (1.06) 1.16 0.320 
 Inevitable decrement  3.22 (1.21) 3.78 (1.24) 3.79 (1.38) 0.90 0.409 
Notes.  aMemory Functioning Questionnaire (Gilewski et al., 1990) with revised frequency and 
seriousness scales (Cherry et al., 2013).  bKnowledge of Memory Aging Questionnaire (Cherry 
et al, 2003).  cMemory Controllability Inventory (Lachman et al., 1995). GDS, MMSE, 
Education level, and vocabulary scores were all entered as covariates. 
  
Goal 2: Individual Differences in Memory Aging Knowledge and Memory Controllability 
 To address the second goal of the research, which concerned individual differences in 
memory aging knowledge and perceptions of memory controllability and their relationship to 
self-reported memory, we first examined age group differences in the KMAQ proportion correct 
scores and MCI ratings.  Means appear in Table 3.  A univariate analysis was carried out on the 
KMAQ normal scores with age group (young-old, old-old, oldest-old) as a between group factor,  
Table 4: Effect Sizes and Power Values (Goal 1) 
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and education level, vocabulary 
score, affective status (through the 
GDS) and cognitive status (through 
the MMSE) were entered as 
covariates.  This analysis yielded a 
non-significant main effect of age, 
F(2, 98) = 1.638, p = 0.200 (see 
Table 3).  This pattern of outcomes, 
where the oldest-old adults’ mean 
is numerically lower than their 
younger counterparts, replicates 
earlier work with very old adults defined as 85 years of age and older (see Hawley et al., 2006).       
Next we tested for age group differences in MCI subscale scores, while controlling for 
possible confounds (MMSE, education level, GDS, and vocabulary).  Univariate analyses 
yielded non-significant age effects for Present Ability, F(2, 98) = 2.206, p =  0.116, Potential for 
Improvement, F(2, 98) = 1.406, p =  0.250, Effort Utility, F(2, 98) = 1.155, p =  0.320, and 
Inevitable Decrement, F(2, 98) = 0.902, p = 0.409.  Two of the four covariates were significant 
(Vocabulary, F(1,94) = 4.700,  p = 0.033; GDS, F(1,94) = 4.384, p = 0.039).  Thus, there is no 
evidence to support the hypothesis that memory controllability ratings decline with age, after 
taking education, vocabulary, MMSE, and GDS into account. 
 Hierarchical Regression Analyses.  Given the non-significant age effects observed in the 
KMAQ and MCI analyses just reported, we collapsed over the age group variable, treating 
chronological age as a continuous variable in the analyses that follow.  Pearson’s correlation 
 Partial η2 1-β 
MFQ   
 Frequency of Forgetting 0.009 0.121 
 Seriousness of Forgetting 0.016 0.180 
 Retrospective Memory 0.045 0.445 
 Mnemonics 0.015 0.166 
MCI   
 Present Ability 0.045 0.440 
 Potential Improvement 0.029 0.295 
 Effort Utility 0.024 0.248 
 Inevitable Decrement 0.019 0.202 
Notes: Values are all after controlling for Education 
Level, Affective status (GDS), Cognitive Ability 
(MMSE), and Verbal Intelligence (vocabulary score). 
   
 
32 
 
coefficients appear in Table 5. The FoF and SoF subscales of the MFQ were found to be 
significantly correlated with each other, r(99) = 0.455, p < 0.01. 
Table 5: Correlations Among Demographic Characteristics, Cognitive 
Variables, and Memory Self-Appraisals (Goal 2)  
 Correlations with MFQ scales 
Variables M (SD) Frequency 
of 
forgetting 
Seriousness of 
forgetting 
Demographic characteristics    
 Age 83.4 (10.0) - 0.12 - 0 .02 
 Education 5.10 (1.35) - 0 .03 0.17 
 Vocabularya 23.9 (7.3) 0.06 0.11 
 GDSb  1.37 (1.67) - 0.24 * - 0.25 * 
Cognitive variables    
 Cognitive statusc 27.9 (1.83) 0.07 0.03 
 KMAQ     
  Normal 0.62 (0.18) 0.009 - 0.01 
  Pathological 0.70 (0.19) 0.010 0.08 
 MCI    
  Present ability 5.13 (1.19) 0.54 **   0.27 ** 
  Improvement 3.77 (0.85) - 0.27 ** - 0.30 ** 
  Effort utility 5.29 (1.02) 0.36 **  0.09 
  Inevitable decrement 3.67 (1.31) - 0.35 ** - 0.16 
Notes.   *  p < 0.05   **  p < 0.01    KMAQ = Knowledge of Memory Aging 
Questionnaire (Cherry et al., 2003).  MCI =  Memory Controllability Inventory 
(Lachman et al., 1995). aVocabulary scores are based on a short-form of the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale Vocabulary subtest (Jastak & Jastak, 1965). bGeriatric 
Depression Scale (Sheikh & Yesavage, 1986).  cCognitive status entries reflect scores 
on the Mini-Mental State Exam (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975).    
 
We entered our set of demographic variables (GDS, vocabulary, and education level) and 
cognitive status measure (MMSE) as a block in the first step of the regressions (see Table 6), to 
control for the potentially confounding influence of these factors.  In the second step, the normal 
memory aging subscale of the KMAQ was added.  In the third step, the subscales of the MCI 
were added predictors for performance on the MFQ.  Table 6 presents the results of hierarchical  
regression analyses on the Frequency of Forgetting scale of the MFQ.   
Table 6:  Hierarchical Regressions (Goal 2)  
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As can be seen in 
Table 6 (Step 1), 
demographic 
variables accounted 
for only 6.9% of the 
variance in the FoF 
scores, with only 
GDS making a 
significant 
contribution.  
However, the overall 
model was non-
significant, F(4, 96) 
= 1.767, p = 0.142.  
In the next step we 
added the KMAQ normal memory aging items, after statistically controlling for the influence of 
the 4 demographic factors.  KMAQ normal items did not make a significant contribution to the 
model.  The overall model was also non-significant, F(5, 95) = 1.399, p = 0.232.  Thus, the 
hypothesis that knowledge of memory aging would influence memory self-efficacy perceptions 
was not supported.   In the third step, we added the four MCI scales.  Inspection of Table 6 
indicates that both Present Ability and Effort Utility made significant contributions to the full 
model, which accounted for 37.1% of the variance in FoF scores.  The overall model was 
significant, F(9, 91) = 5.977, p < 0.001.  However, GDS lost its significance in this model.  
Variables R2 Incre R2 β  t p 
Frequency of forgetting 
(MFQ) 
     
 Step 1 (demographics)  0.069     
 
 GDSb * 
  - 
0.243 
- 
2.395 
0.019 
 
 Education 
  - 
0.132 
- 
1.080 
0.283 
  Vocabularya    0.088   0.700 0.486 
  MMSEc    0.023   0.222 0.825 
 Step 2 (KMAQ)  0.069 0.00    
  Normal     0.002  0.019 0.985 
 Step 3 (MCI)  0.371 .302    
  Present ability **     0.371  3.583 0.001 
  Improvement   - 
0.171 
- 
1.685 
0.093 
  Effort utility *     0.255   2.300 0.024 
  Inevitable 
decrement 
  - 
0.023 
- 
0.214 
0.831 
* p < 0.05 **  p < 0.01  MFQ = Memory Functioning Questionnaire 
(Gilewski et al., 1990) with revised frequency and seriousness scales 
(cf.  Cherry et al., 2013).  KMAQ = Knowledge of Memory Aging 
Questionnaire (Cherry et al., 2003)  MCI =  Memory Controllability 
Inventory (Lachman et al., 1995)  Notes. aVocabulary scores are based 
on a short-form of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Vocabulary 
subtest (Jastak & Jastak, 1965). bGeriatric Depression Scale (Sheikh & 
Yesavage, 1986).  cCognitive status entries reflect scores on the Mini-
Mental State Exam (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975).    
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We conducted 
the same hierarchical 
regression analyses on 
the MFQ Seriousness of 
Forgetting scale (see 
Table 7).  In step 1, 
demographic variables 
alone accounted for 
only 7.8% of the 
variance in the SoF 
scores, with only GDS 
making a significant 
contribution.  However, 
the overall model was 
non-significant, F(4, 96) 
= 2.019, p = 0.098.  In 
step 2, the KMAQ normal scores were added to the model.  As in the preceding analysis, the 
KMAQ normal scores did not make a significant contribution.  The overall model was also not 
significant, F(5, 95) = 1.634, p = 0.158, so these data indicate that knowledge of memory aging 
does not appear to influence seriousness of forgetting perceptions either.   In the third step, we 
added the four MCI scales.  Only the Potential for Improvement variable made a significant 
contribution.  The full model was also significant, F(9, 91) = 2.362, p  
Table 7:  Hierarchical Regressions (Goal 2)  
Variables R2 Incre R2 β  t p 
Seriousness of 
forgetting (MFQ) 
     
 Step 1 
(demographic 
variables)  
0.078     
  GDSb *   - 0.230 - 2.277 0.025 
  Education     0.122   0.999 0.320 
  Vocabularya    0.014   0.111 0.912 
  MMSEc   - 0.047  - 0.444 0.658 
 Step 2 (KMAQ)  0.079 0.001    
  Normal    - 0.042 - 0.407 0.685 
 Step 3 (MCI)  0.189 .110    
  Present ability      0.150  1.275 0.205 
  Improvement 
* 
  - 0.245 - 2.139 0.035 
  Effort utility      0.023   0.182 0.856 
  Inevitable 
decrement 
  - 0.040 - 0.332 0.741 
Notes. *  p < 0.05   **  p < 0.01  MFQ = Memory Functioning 
Questionnaire (Gilewski et al., 1990) with revised frequency and 
seriousness scales (cf.  Cherry et al., 2013). KMAQ = Knowledge 
of Memory Aging Questionnaire (Cherry et al., 2003)  MCI =  
Memory Controllability Inventory (Lachman et al., 1995)  
aVocabulary scores are based on a short-form of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale Vocabulary subtest (Jastak & Jastak, 1965). 
bGeriatric Depression Scale (Sheikh & Yesavage, 1986).  cCognitive 
status entries reflect scores on the Mini-Mental State Exam 
(Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975).    
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= 0.019, accounting for 18.9% of the variance in SoF scores.  Taken together, the results 
of the regression analyses offer partial support of the Goal 2 hypothesis.  That is, the notion that 
memory aging knowledge would contribute to self-reported memory assessed with the MFQ was 
not supported.  However, the significant contributions of Present Ability and Effort Utility (see 
Table 6) to FoF scores, coupled with the significant contribution of Potential for Improvement to 
SoF scores (see Table 7), confirms that these aspects of memory controllability predict memory 
self-appraisals, in support of our hypothesis.  
Goal 3: Memory Aging Intervention 
 Both the waitlist control and diary control groups for the intervention were compared 
using t-tests to ensure that the groups were not significantly different on any subscales (means 
for each group in the intervention are reported in Tables 8 and 9). The groups were not different 
and control groups were collapsed for all further analyses (see Table 10). Thus, having a diary 
Table 8:  Self-Rated Memory by Intervention Group MFQ (Goal 3) 
  Control group 1 
(Wait-list, n = 20) 
Control group 2 
(Diary Control, n = 20) 
Experimental group 
(Diary + Exercises, n = 
40) 
 Older Oldest-Old Older Oldest-Old Older Oldest-Old 
MFQa       
 FOFb       
  Pretest 4.93 (0.87) 4.25 (0.86) 4.76 (0.74) 4.91 (1.05) 4.87 (0.63) 4.75 (0.82) 
  Posttest 4.87 (0.67) 4.65 (0.69) 4.71 (0.65) 4.71 (0.61) 4.75 (0.55) 4.77 (0.76) 
 SOFc       
  Pretest 5.20 (1.10) 4.10 (1.29) 5.26 (0.91) 4.88 (0.88) 4.32 (1.18) 4.83 (1.38) 
  Posttest 4.92 (1.29) 4.24 (1.36) 4.82 (1.22) 5.14 (1.19) 4.65 (1.17) 4.48 (1.16) 
 RETROd       
  Pretest 3.44 (0.54) 3.24 (1.03) 3.72 (1.01) 3.48 (1.19) 3.04 (0.65) 3.51 (0.84) 
  Posttest 3.26 (0.83) 3.22 (0.75) 3.54 (0.57) 3.42 (0.72) 3.28 (0.70) 3.46 (0.74) 
 MNEMe       
  Pretest 3.30 (0.81) 3.01 (0.77) 3.69 (0.88) 3.89 (1.21) 3.04 (1.05) 3.33 (1.38) 
  Posttest 3.16 (1.09) 3.29 (1.15) 3.68 (1.14) 3.93 (1.12) 2.93 (1.20) 3.28 (1.12) 
Notes. aMemory Functioning Questionnaire (Gilewski et al., 1990) with revised frequency and 
seriousness scales (cf.  Cherry et al., 2013).  bFrequency of Forgetting, cSeriousness of Forgetting, 
dRetrospective Functioning, eMnemonics Usage. 
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did not in itself alter participants’ memory self-appraisals differently compared to those in a 
waitlist group. 
Table 9: Self-Rated Memory by Intervention Group MCI (Goal 3) 
 Control group 1 
(Wait-list, n = 20) 
Control group 2 
(Diary Control, n = 20) 
Experimental group 
(Diary + Exercises, n = 
40) 
 Older Oldest-Old Older Oldest-Old Older Oldest-Old 
MCIa       
 Present 
ability 
      
  Pretest 5.20 (1.09) 4.70 (1.22) 5.37 (1.28) 4.93 (1.91) 5.00 (1.13) 5.22 (1.10) 
  Posttest 5.00 (1.11) 4.70 (1.23) 5.04 (1.59) 4.90 (1.26) 5.30 (1.00) 5.05 (1.13) 
 Improvement       
  Pretest 3.90 (0.96) 4.10 (0.57) 4.00 (0.72) 3.57 (0.97) 3.68 (0.77) 3.77 (0.93) 
  Posttest 4.10 (1.08) 3.97 (0.78) 3.83 (0.65) 3.77 (0.77) 3.78 (0.72) 3.90 (0.77) 
 Effort utility       
  Pretest 5.47 (1.00) 5.13 (1.66) 5.60 (1.10) 5.27 (1.15) 5.30 (1.03) 5.20 (0.71) 
  Posttest 5.00 (1.19) 5.03 (1.84) 5.53 (1.01) 5.20 (1.39) 5.50 (0.93) 5.02 (0.93) 
 Inevitable 
decrement 
      
  Pretest 3.50 (1.52) 3.97 (1.33) 3.23 (1.44) 4.03 (1.54) 3.47 (1.16) 3.62 (1.15) 
  Posttest 3.67 (1.50) 3.77 (1.55) 3.13 (1.49) 3.87 (1.60) 3.03 (1.05) 3.35 (1.16) 
Notes. aMemory Controllability Inventory (Lachman et al., 1995). 
 
Table 10: Wait-list Control Group and Diary Control Group Comparisons 
 Control Groups 
Older 
Control Groups Oldest-
Old 
PreTest t (18) p t (18) p 
  MFQ  
 Frequency of Forgetting 0.47 0.64 -1.53 0.14 
 Seriousness of Forgetting -0.13 0.90 -1.58 0.13 
  MCI  
 Present Ability -0.31 0.76 -0.33 0.75 
 Potential Improvement -0.26 0.80 1.50 0.15 
 Effort Utility -0.28 0.78 -0.21 0.84 
 Inevitable Decrement 0.40 0.69 -0.10 0.92 
PostTest  
  MFQ  
 Frequency of Forgetting 0.54 0.59 -0.21 0.84 
 Seriousness of Forgetting 0.18 0.86 -1.58 0.13 
  MCI  
 Present Ability -0.06 0.95 -0.36 0.72 
 Potential Improvement 0.67 0.51 0.58 0.57 
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 Effort Utility -1.08 0.29 -0.23 0.82 
 Inevitable Decrement 0.78 0.45 -0.14 0.89 
 
A 2(Age Group) x 2 (Intervention Group) x 2(Time of Testing) mixed ANOVA was 
conducted for the subscales of the MFQ. Analyses revealed no significant main effects for age 
group, intervention group, or time of testing (see Tables 11 and 12) all with p’s >0.05. The 
interactions did not yield significant differences, p’s > 0.05.   
The 3-way 
interaction was not 
significant for the 
FoF subscale.  
However, the 3-way 
interaction effect 
was significant for 
the SoF subscale, 
F(1,73) = 10.21, p 
= 0.002.   
The statistical 
significance of this 
effect is most likely 
attributable to a 
significant age group difference in the control condition at pre-test (p = 0.035).  To be precise, 
the older and oldest-old adults differed at pre-test, with means of 5.23 and 4.49 in the control 
condition, respectively.   There were no other significant pairwise differences observed between 
Table 11: Frequency of Forgetting 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA  
Main Effects F (1, 70) p 
 Time of testing: Pretest, Posttest 2.18 0.15 
 Age Group: Older, Oldest-Old 0.16 0.70 
 Intervention Group: Control, Experimental 0.002 0.97 
2 x 2 Interactions   
    Time of Testing x Intervention Group 0.43 0.51 
    Time of Testing x Age Group 2.10 0.15 
    Age Group x Intervention Group 0.43 0.52 
2 x 2 x 2 Interactions   
Time of Testing x Intervention Group x Age Group 0.01 0.94 
Notes: controlled for MMSE, Education, Vocabulary, and GDS 
Table 12: Seriousness of Forgetting 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA  
Main Effects F (1, 72) p 
 Time of testing: Pretest, Posttest 0.40 0.53 
 Age Group: Older, Oldest-Old 0.29 0.59 
 Intervention Group: Control, Experimental 1.93 0.17 
2 x 2 Interactions   
    Time of Testing x Intervention Group 0.28 0.60 
    Time of Testing x Age Group 0.50 0.48 
    Age Group x Intervention Group 1.64 0.20 
2 x 2 x 2 Interactions   
Time of Testing x Intervention Group x Age Group 10.21 0.002* 
Notes: controlled for MMSE, Education, Vocabulary, and GDS 
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the two age groups (p’s > 0.217).  Further, we note within age group differences in the direction 
of the pre- and post-test means for older adults across the control and experimental conditions.   
For older adults in the control group, the pre-test (M = 5.23) exceeded the post-test (M = 4.87), a 
marginally significant difference (p = 0.055), whereas in the experimental group, older adults’ 
pre-test (M = 4.32) was somewhat lower than the post-test (M = 4.65), but not significantly so (p 
= 0.078).   Because these pairwise differences in the analyses of SoF subscale scores likely 
reflect sampling error stemming from a small sample size, interpretative caution is warranted.   
A 2(Age Group) x 2 (Intervention Group) x 2 (Time of Testing) ANOVA was carried out 
to examine differences in performance on the MCI subscales. Our findings revealed no 
significant main effects or interactions (see Tables 13-16). The hypothesis that memory self-
efficacy and memory controllability beliefs would be changed through the present intervention 
method was not supported. 
Table 13: Present Ability MCI 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA  
Main Effects F (1, 71) p 
 Time of testing: Pretest, Posttest 1.06 0.31 
 Age Group: Older, Oldest-Old 0.07 0.79 
 Intervention Group: Control, Experimental <0.001 0.99 
2 x 2 Interactions   
    Time of Testing x Intervention Group 0.93 0.34 
    Time of Testing x Age Group 0.47 0.49 
    Age Group x Intervention Group 0.91 0.34 
2 x 2 x 2 Interactions   
Time of Testing x Intervention Group x Age Group 2.40 0.13 
Notes: controlled for MMSE, Education, Vocabulary, and GDS 
 
Table 14: Potential Improvement MCI 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA 
Main Effects F (1, 73) p 
 Time of testing: Pretest, Posttest 1.94 0.17 
 Age Group: Older, Oldest-Old 1.97 0.17 
 Intervention Group: Control, Experimental 0.001 0.98 
2 x 2 Interactions   
    Time of Testing x Intervention Group 0.72 0.40 
    Time of Testing x Age Group 0.20 0.66 
    Age Group x Intervention Group 0.11 0.74 
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2 x 2 x 2 Interactions   
Time of Testing x Intervention Group x Age Group 0.01 0.92 
Notes: controlled for MMSE, Education, Vocabulary, and GDS 
 
Table 15: Effort Utility MCI 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA  
Main Effects F (1, 72) p 
 Time of testing: Pretest, Posttest 0.01 0.94 
 Age Group: Older, Oldest-Old 1.41 0.24 
 Intervention Group: Control, Experimental 0.26 0.61 
2 x 2 Interactions   
    Time of Testing x Intervention Group 0.38 0.54 
    Time of Testing x Age Group 0.19 0.66 
    Age Group x Intervention Group 0.003 0.96 
2 x 2 x 2 Interactions   
Time of Testing x Intervention Group x Age Group 2.67 0.11 
Notes: controlled for MMSE, Education, Vocabulary, and GDS 
 
Table 16: Inevitable Decrement MCI 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA  
Main Effects F (1, 71) p 
 Time of testing: Pretest, Posttest 1.93 0.17 
 Age Group: Older, Oldest-Old 2.21 0.14 
 Intervention Group: Control, Experimental 0.13 0.72 
2 x 2 Interactions   
    Time of Testing x Intervention Group 0.12 0.73 
    Time of Testing x Age Group 0.49 0.49 
    Age Group x Intervention Group 0.59 0.45 
2 x 2 x 2 Interactions   
Time of Testing x Intervention Group x Age Group 0.65 0.42 
Notes: controlled for MMSE, Education, Vocabulary, and GDS 
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DISCUSSION 
Our hypothesis that memory self-efficacy and memory controllability perceptions decline 
in late life was not supported.  These findings extend Cherry et al. (2013a) to include the oldest-
old in the subjective memory appraisal comparisons. Understanding how one thinks about their 
own memory capabilities will allow us to compare subjective memory assessments with standard 
objective memory tests, and better formulate intervention methods to maintain or improve 
memory self-efficacy.  Studying the oldest-old adults’ memory appraisals can provide insight 
into memory expectations and observations made by those who have lived longer than most 
others, an area of research where systematic study is currently lacking.  Understanding how 
memory self-appraisals remain stable with increasing age can help to further establish what 
constitutes these appraisals and what can be done to strengthen those beliefs.  Research on 
nonagenarians can provide valuable insight into how the oldest-old compensate for memory 
losses incurred with aging through compensatory mechanisms (Baltes & Baltes, 1990). 
We used peoples’ knowledge of memory aging assessed with the KMAQ to predict 
memory self-efficacy indexed by the MFQ.  Based on previous research (Reese & Cherry, 2006; 
Cherry et al., 2013a), we expected that memory aging knowledge and memory controllability 
(KMAQ, MCI) would be related to self-efficacy of memory (MFQ).  Our results only partially 
supported this hypothesis (Goal 2).  Contrary to expectation, the KMAQ did not contribute to the 
variance in MFQ scores. However, two of the MCI subscales (Present ability and Effort Utility) 
contributed to the variance in Frequency of Forgetting, and one subscale of the MCI contributed 
to variance in Seriousness of Forgetting (Potential Improvement).  When one has perceived 
control of his or her memory, he or she will recognize the importance of continued efforts 
towards improving their memory.  Heckhausen and Schultz ‘s (1995) control theory is based on 
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the notion that people attempt to control their environment, and when they cannot control their 
environment, attempts are made to change themselves (secondary control) to better fit their 
surroundings.  If an individual has a failing memory, and if he or she holds high control beliefs, 
such an individual may be more likely to seek ways to retain control and maintain their memory 
abilities (instead of believing memory deficits are hopeless and beyond the ability to maintain or 
remedy). 
The intervention addressed the malleability of MFQ self-efficacy perceptions indexed by 
the MFQ, with the goal of improving self-efficacy.  Our attempt to show an increase in memory 
self-efficacy and perceived control of memory did not yield significant differences across 
intervention groups.  The findings imply that beliefs about memory are stable, and remain strong 
past the age of 90. These findings suggest that nonagenarians think about their memory 
functioning the same way 60, 70, and 80 year olds do.  Without being able to control our 
memory, or work at compensating for declines, the aging mind would be very bleak.  Our 
participants appear to be flourishing in their memory self-appraisals, which gives us a glimpse of 
a lifelong model of continued learning and adaptability, compensating for losses as they arise.  
Our intervention did not demonstrate improvements in self-appraisal, which could be due 
to a sample selection bias in the direction of vitality.  Participants in the Louisiana Healthy 
Aging Study are exemplars of excellent health and pillars of longevity. Our sample of 
individuals rated their health as better than others their same age (see Table 2). It is highly likely 
that individuals who did not feel like they were aging successfully to begin with would have 
opted out of our study, even though they would have had the most to gain by participating. 
Future research should aim to find participants that have poorer memory self-appraisals and 
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work towards creating interventions that would bolster marked improvements in self-efficacy 
and control beliefs.  
 The eventual goal of any memory training intervention program is transfer to real world 
situations, to help in everyday situations when memory fails us (Hawley & Cherry, 2004).  
McDaniel and Bugg (2012) address the issue that transfer from laboratory tasks is generally 
minimal, even for younger adults.  In everyday situations like remembering a grocery list, even a 
former world memory champion still writes down what he wants from the store.  This suggests 
using the everyday strategy for remembering utilizes external memory cues in order to carry out 
prospective memory tasks (tasks that must be carried out at some future time or place).  
McDaniel and Bugg suggest training programs and strategies should target memory contexts 
where older adults struggle and want to improve.  This changes the general focus of the 
strategies from encoding (method of loci, etc.) to retrieval processes.  One method that focuses 
on retrieval processes is the Cognitive Interview (Dornberg & McDaniel, 2006; McCauley & 
Fisher, 1995; Mello & Fisher, 1996).  This technique involves instructing a participant to 
visualize the environment in which the information was learned, and recall the information from 
a variety of perspectives, forcing participants to attempt recall several times.  This interviewing 
technique has been found to increase correct recall even after a 3-week delay (Dornberg & 
McDaniel, 2006) and provided older adults with more benefit than the younger adults (Mello & 
Fisher, 1996).  Prospective memory training can involve external devices or a spaced retrieval 
technique.  To improve transfer of training, McDaniel and Bugg suggest studies incorporate the 
transferring in the lab in examples of how techniques could be used, requiring homework and 
feedback from participants about how they used their new memory methods, and increasing 
participants’ knowledge of how memory works so they can see the uses and structuring of the 
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targeted training.  Other research has documented that memory training exercises alone have 
little effect on peoples’ beliefs about memory aging (Floyd & Scogin, 1997).  Rather, memory 
training coupled with cognitive restructuring to improve adaptive beliefs about memory aging 
appears to be the most effective for older persons (Lachman et al., 1992).  These studies suggest 
that either our sample did not need restructuring in their beliefs about memory, or that our 
experimental manipulation was not strong enough to elicit a change. 
Future research ought to continue efforts to improve memory self-efficacy and memory 
controllability as the connections to objective memory performance have not been fully 
explored.  Logically, if one holds the belief that they are in control of their memory, and they are 
equipped with knowledge of how memory works, they will seek out ways to maintain their level 
of current memory performance and utilize methods to improve their memory capabilities. 
Methods to improve objective memory performance reliably would be of high importance for 
those that feel their capabilities slipping with age.  With more memory knowledge, it logically 
follows the individual would have more accurate views and predictions of their own memory 
abilities and performance. Future research could be conducted using the LHAS data that looks 
more closely at the connections between knowledge of memory aging, memory self-efficacy, and 
objective memory measures like Forward and Backward Digit Spans and the Size Judgment 
Span. 
Research about the lifespan SOC model has led developmental researchers in the 
neuroscience realm into looking at biological changes that occur with aging, and they have found 
compensatory mechanisms exist at the neuronal level.  Future directions as well as application 
for the SOC theory at this microscopic level would indicate an unconscious effort by the body to 
compensate for losses (Phillips & Andres, 2010).  Park and McDonough (2013) found neuronal 
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differences between their younger and older participants, with higher levels of activity in the 
older adults, suggestive of additional recruitment and compensation.  Biological directions such 
as these further the depth and breadth of the SOC model as it applies to developmental science. 
Further exploration of individual differences, especially those of personality measures 
would be a worthwhile venture.  Metamemory has been found to interact with personality traits 
(see Cavanaugh, 1996), and personality traits might influence aspects of memory self-appraisals 
(Perri-Chiello, Perrig & Stähelin, 2000).  Our study design was cross-sectional, which eliminates 
the possibility to make claims of changes as we age. Longitudinal research is critical in order to 
make the most accurate claims about age related changes.  Infurna, Gerstorf, Ram, Schupp and 
Wagner (2011) conducted a longitudinal study looking at perceived control beliefs. They found 
that perceived control was predicted by having higher levels of self-rated health, and that age 
interacted with life satisfaction.  This suggests that control beliefs could stem from well-being.    
 Expanding the age range of participants to age groups below 65 would add to the 
literature, and help to determine if memory self-efficacy and memory control beliefs are stable 
across the lifespan, or if the stability noted in the current research is reserved for older adults. 
Perhaps memory self-efficacy is more rigid than previously thought, or perhaps the strength of 
the current intervention was too weak to elicit an increase in perceptions. Future research should 
test stronger intervention methods. 
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